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Abstract 
 
This research extends the study of Boscaljon and Ho1 and test the effect of market 
response to bank loan announcement in the Hong Kong banking market after the 1997 
Asian crisis. The study also investigates whether bank is still “special” in the financial 
market by comparing the market response to bank loan announcement and non-bank 
loan announcement. Finally, the study examines how loan characteristics influence the 
market response to bank loan announcement. The main findings of our study are 
consistent with the previous results documented for the U.S., Canada and Hong Kong 
markets, and further confirm the “uniqueness” of banks in the financial market. 
Moreover, we find that market response is significant positively related to borrower’s 
debt ratio, and there is also a strong evidence of information leakage problem for non-
bank loan announcements in the Hong Kong stock market.    
 
 
JEL Classifications:  G14, G21 
Keywords: bank loan announcements, abnormal returns, information asymmetry, 
event studies 
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1. Introduction  
 
One of the reasons for financial intermediaries’ existence is information asymmetries. 
According to Campbell and Krasaw,2 the importance of financial intermediate is 
information transmission, which could reduce the information asymmetry and 
increase the market efficiency. As discussed by Diamond,3 financial intermediaries 
could be very efficient in evaluating and monitoring borrowers. During the process of 
information transmission, the bank is theoretically and empirically believed to be able 
to provide unique services in the production of information. 
 
During the information transmission process, the bank is believed to be able to 
provide unique services in the production of information and resolving the moral 
hazard problem. There are a large amount of theoretical and empirical studies 
discussing the issue of whether banks are “special”.4,5 Most of the earlier studies test 
the “uniqueness” of bank loans by examining the hypothesis that market response to 
bank loan announcement is different from publicly traded debt and non-bank loan 
announcement. The literatures confirm Fama4 and James’5 findings and suggest banks 
are more efficient in information gathering and monitoring borrowers. Bank loan 
announcement should convey valuable information to the market about the borrower’s 
financial situation, and the market response to bank loan announcement positively.4-8 
Aintablian and Roberts9 report that bank lending is different from non-bank lending 
(public debt and non-bank private placements) since bank could provide unique 
monitoring services, and bank loan announcements are associated with positive 
abnormal returns significantly higher than private placements and public debt. 
Therefore, banks have comparative advantages in information production and 
transmission. 
 
James and Smith10 revisited the issue and questioned the uniqueness role of bank. The 
authors find that banks are still “special” in providing “commitment based financing 
to corporations”. However, Billett et al. 11 and Fields et al12 both questioned the 
“special” role of bank and find the market response to bank loan announcement have 
diminished since the findings by James.5 Fields et al12 suggest the diminishing market 
reaction to bank loan announcement is consistent with the dramatic change in both 
financial market and information market. 
 
Apart from comparing the market response to bank loan announcement, public traded 
debt and non-bank loan announcement have been employed to examine the 
uniqueness of bank. Several studies have also examined how the factors, such as 
borrower characteristics, lender characteristics, and loan characteristics could 
influence the market reaction to loan announcements.6,13,14 In addition, the 
information content of bank loan announcement is also generated under different 
banking system compared to most of the studies in the US, Canada, and UK banking 
system.9,15 For example, Boscaljon and Ho1 investigate the information content of 
bank loan announcements of Asian firms prior to and after the 1997 Asian crisis. The 
authors examined the changes in the borrower-lender relationship and found lender 
quality is the most important factor that could influence the information content of 
bank loan announcements.  
 
This research extends the study of Boscaljon and Ho1 and test the effect of market 
response to bank loan announcement in the Hong Kong banking market after the 1997 
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Asian crisis. The study also investigates whether bank is still “special” in the financial 
market by comparing the market response to bank loan announcement and non-bank 
loan announcement. Finally, we examine how factors, such as loan syndication, loan 
purpose, loan maturity, debt ratio, firm size and borrower’s industry type influence 
the market response to bank loan announcement. The main findings of this paper are 
consistent with the previous results documented for the U.S., Canada and Hong Kong 
market, and further confirms the “uniqueness” of bank in the financial market. 
Moreover, we find that market response is significant positively related to borrower’s 
debt ratio, and there is also a strong evidence of information leakage problem for non-
bank loan announcements in the Hong Kong stock market.   
 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews existing literatures on bank loan 
announcements. Section 3 describes the sample selection and methodology. The 
analysis of the empirical findings is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the 
results for regression analysis, and Section 6 presents the conclusions of the study. 
 
 
2. Literatures on Bank Loan Announcement  
 
As with any other business relation, Leland and Pyle16 suggested that bank 
relationship involves information asymmetry and moral hazard problem. The bank-
borrower relation enables them to obtain information not available to other providers 
of funds. Bank loan contract could also control the borrower’s risk-taking propensity, 
especially in the form of collateral. Fama4 also discusses the special role of bank, and 
states that a bank is “special” due to its comparative advantages in gathering 
information and monitoring debt contracts compare with other financial institutions. 
The author concludes there are two comparative advantages for bank loans. One is the 
relatively lower costs for monitoring firms, and the other is the convenience of 
accessing firms’ private information.  
 
James5 provides a testable hypothesis to test the uniqueness of bank loans by 
comparing the stock price response among the publicly announced bank credit 
agreements, private placement and publicly placed debt. In James’ finding, there is a 
non-negative stock price return for bank loan and non-positive stock price return for 
publicly placed debt which support Fama’s argument. However, James5 reported a 
non-negative stock price return for private placement. This result is similar to 
Mikkelson and Partch17 finding, which is inconsistent with Fama’s inside debt 
argument. Therefore, the inside argument could not completely explain the market 
reaction to bank loan announcement. 18 
 
Lummer and McConnell6 expanded the research from James5 and Mikkelson and 
Partch17 and made a distinction between new bank loans and loan renewals. Their 
result suggests a positive stock price response to the bank loan announcements, and 
the authors explained that bank loan announcements could only convey information to 
the market after the establishment of an ongoing relationship, which is reflected in the 
loan renewal. In terms of loan maturity, James5 argued there should be a more 
positive effect on the market reaction for shorter maturities, since shorter maturity 
loan could enhance the ability to renew which could increase the monitoring ability. 
James5 argument is further confirmed by Aintablian and Roberts9 and James and 
Wier.19 
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In addition to loan type and loan maturity, Preece and Mullineaux13 investigated the 
impact of loan syndication on the market response to loan announcement. The authors 
formulated a contractual flexibility hypothesis that as the number of lender increases 
(syndication increases), the contracting costs will increase and the value of capacity to 
renegotiate (contractual flexibility) should decline. The capacity to renegotiate is 
considered as a value of the capacity of the firms to utilize financial situation. 
Therefore, Preece and Mullineaux13 argued that there should be a negative 
relationship between the borrowing firms’ abnormal returns and the syndicate size. 
 
James5 tested the excess returns for bank loan announcements by loan purposes and 
categorized the loan purposes into “repay debt”, “capital expenditure”, “general 
corporate purpose”, “repay bank loans”, and “no purpose given”. Slovin et al. 14 also 
investigated this issue considering “future acquisitions.”  Both James5 and Slovin et 
al.14 did not find statistically significant result for the above categories except for the 
loans with general corporate purposes. Boscaljon and Ho1, however, considered 
restructuring as an additional category and showed statistically positive result for 
capital expenditures, no specific purpose and repayment. In contrast, the authors did 
not find statistically significant result for general corporate purposes, which is not 
consistent with earlier findings. 
 
Slovin et al.14 discussed whether the share price responses to bank loan announcement 
differ between small firms and large firms. Since small firms have relatively short 
history, less reputation and the problem of moral hazard, therefore adverse selection 
for small firms is more significant. The authors suggested banks should investigate 
more on small firms for monitoring and evaluating. On the other hand, large firms are 
considered to be well monitored and have good reputations, therefore the banks have 
relatively less comparative advantage on evaluating and monitoring financial decision 
of large firms. Similarly, Wansley et al. 8 and Aintablian and Roberts9 also reported 
that small firms receive greater benefit from banks’ monitoring services, which 
confirmed the finding by Slovin et al.14 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri20 used a model to test the choice between bank loan and 
public traded debt for firms with consideration of the possibility of debt renegotiation 
in times of financial distress. The authors found that firms in financial distress 
preferred bank loan with a higher interest rate, and firms with lower probability in 
financial distress preferred publicly traded debt, because they could avoid competing 
with high risk firms in bank loans and are able to borrow at a lower equilibrium 
interest rate. 
Best and Zhang21 re-examined the role of bank loans by looking at not only 
information production from the bank perspective, but also from the financial analysts 
perspective, who is capable in evaluating and monitoring the borrowers’ behavior. 
The analysts could gather and monitor information, and thus their services could be 
considered as a substitute for banks’ services. The authors argued that the function of 
the financial analysts did influence banks’ decisions on where to put their best 
evaluating and monitoring efforts. Banks would put more monitoring and 
investigating efforts on the borrower if the information of the borrower is initially 
signal-declining or the financial indicator is noisy and unclear. Their result is 
consistent with the Slovin et al.’s finding.14 
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Dahiya et al. 22  on the other hand tested the information content of the announcement 
of a sale of a borrower’s loan by the lending bank. The authors suggested that when 
lenders sell a bank loan to the secondary market, they covey the information to the 
market as they are not satisfied with the borrowers’ situation. Traders also believed 
that banks know some information which they do not know. This argument confirmed 
the uniqueness of bank loans suggested by James5, and the hypothesis from Campbell 
and Kracaw, 2 Diamond,3 and Fama,4 which demonstrated that banks are insiders to 
the borrowers’ information production, evaluation, and monitoring. 
  
Fields et al.12 revisited the study from Petersen and Rajan,23 and suggested that the 
borrowers’ information is capable to verify at a much lower cost due to the changes in 
the information market. The authors also questioned the validity of the information 
content conveyed by bank loans due to the recent changes in financial markets.  The 
authors suggested that the value of certification provided by bank loans could be 
reduced, thus lessen the market reaction to the loan announcements. 
 
Different banking environment is also evidenced to influence the market response to 
bank loan announcements. Armitage’s study15 on the U.K. stock market showed less 
responsive to loan announcement compared to the U.S. studies. Aintablian and 
Roberts’s study9 on Canada capital market showed similar result as the U.S. cases, 
and studies on China market from Bailey et al.24 reported opposite results to previous 
studies due to its special politically controlled banking industry. 
 
For the market efficiency of Hong Kong stock market, Wong et al. 25 investigated the 
abnormal returns associated with insider trading from 1991 to 1993 in the Hong Kong 
stock market. The authors reported that the abnormal profits associated with insider 
trading are concentrated on small firms, and insiders for medium-sized and large 
firms do not earn abnormal profits. The results indicated that Hong Kong stock 
market of medium and large size firms is efficient in both strong and semi-strong 
form of market efficiency, and market for small firms is only efficient in semi-strong 
form of market efficiency. 
 
Wong26 also found the insider trading problem in the Hong Kong stock market by 
testing the abnormal price and volume performances associated with corporate news 
announcements from 1994 to 2002. The author reported little inside trading activities 
for Hong Kong and the U.S. stocks in the Hong Kong stock market, but a significant 
inside trading activities in China-affiliated firms listed in the Hong Kong stock market. 
Cheuk et al. 27 also reported that insiders are able to earn profit from buy and sell 
activities in Hong Kong sock market. 
 
 
3. Sample Selection and Methodology 
 
The sample of loan announcements is obtained from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
Database. The database provides comprehensive announcements of all listed 
companies in Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Besides the full text of the loan 
announcement, Hong Kong Stock Exchange Database also provides the exact 
announcement date and time. This information provides a precise assessment of the 
announcement date. Market data used in this study are collected from the Data Stream 
Database. 
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Following the method employed by Billett et al.,7 key words such as “credit 
agreement”, “credit extension”, “credit facility”, “credit line”, “new loan”, “bank 
loan”, and “term loan” are used to search the loan announcement for the period from 
2002 to 2007.  Initially a total of 606 announcements are obtained. According to 
Boscaljon and Ho,1 any announcement which contains “contaminated information,” 
such as information on dividends, earnings, stock issues, debt issues, divestitures, 
bankruptcy filings, management changes, joint ventures, stock repurchases, and asset 
sales are deleted from the initial sample. Further deletion is applied if the borrower is 
no longer a listed company in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in 2008, or the 
announcement is announced by the parent company for the indirect/direct wholly/non-
wholly owned subsidiaries. Another 24 observations are eliminated due to the 
incomplete daily stock return data from DataStream, and 14 more are deleted since 
the lenders are bank and non-bank with mixed loans. Therefore, the initial sample of 
606 observations is reduced to 85 uncontaminated announcements, consisting 63 bank 
loan announcements and 17 non-bank loan announcements. Similar to the study by 
Aintablian and Roberts9 in Canadian market and Boscaljon and Ho1 in Hong Kong 
market, our sample size is much smaller than the earlier U.S. studies. This is due to 
the shorter time period, data availability, and the relatively smaller financial market 
capitalization. 
 
Based on Lummer and McConnell’s study, 6 loans are classified into new loans and 
renewal loans. Renewal loans are further divided into favorable renewals and 
unfavorable renewals based on the context of each announcement. Loan agreements 
are classified as new loans if it indicates it is new or does not indicate it is renewal. 
Due to the short period of the study, only 11 renewal loan announcements are 
obtained, including 1 bank loan favorable renewal, 1 bank loan unfavorable renewal, 
and 9 favorable renewals for loans from non-bank financial institutions. The small 
sample size in loan renewal also limited to further test between new loan and loan 
renewal. 
 
Following Slovin et al.’s study,14 firm size is classified by using the median market 
value/total assets of all listed firms in the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in that relevant 
year. The total sample is then divided into small and large groups. Firms are defined 
as small if the market value/total assets is less than the median market value/total 
assets or large if greater than the median value. Under this classification, 48 firms are 
grouped as large firms and 14 are grouped as small firms by market capitalization; 50 
firms are grouped as large firms and 12 are grouped as small firms by total assets.     
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Based on the information content of announcement, 43 loans are classified as 
syndicated loan and 19 are considered as non-syndicated. However, the number of 
lenders for syndicated loan is not observable. 
 
Following James5 and Aintablian and Roberts, 9 loan size is adjusted into relative loan 
size by using the dollar value of loan size divided by total assets of the firm. Loan 
amount valued as foreign currency are converted into Hong Kong dollar at the 
exchange rate of that specific day of signing the loan contract. The exchange rate is 
obtained from the historical exchange rates in OANDA forex trading and currency 
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information database, which is one of the world’s largest historical high frequency, 
filtered currency database. 
 
Following the small sample and large number of mixed purpose loans, loan purposes 
are classified into four groups: “general purpose”, “refinancing and capital 
expenditure mixed purpose”, “no purpose stated”, and “other purpose”. Under this 
classification, 8 announcements are defined as general purposes, 24 as refinancing 
and capital expenditure mixed purpose loan announcements, 20 as no specific purpose, 
and 10 of the announcements are for other purposes. 
 
Based on Bhushan’s study, 28 firm’s industry type is an important firm characteristics 
and Brumm18 reported that industry type of borrowing firm could influence the 
market response to bank loan announcement. Industry types of sample firms were 
collected from PREFACE database. Firms’ industry types that were not included in 
the PREFACE database are further obtained from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange 
website. Industry types include finance company, utilities, property, consolidated 
enterprises, industrial, hotel, and others. Industry groups are further classified into 
property, consolidated enterprise, industrial, and others. 
 
Debt ratio is obtained by using total debt divided by total assets of the borrower 
following the methodology of Ongena and Roscovan.29 The data for total debt and 
total assets are collected from DataStream Database. Loan maturity data is collected 
from the content of each announcement. Most of the bank loans are short term loan 
between 1 to 5 years. The total sample is then grouped into 3 categories: less than 3 
years, 3 years, and longer than 3 years. 
 
Daily return data and daily share prices are obtained from DataStream Database, as 
well as the information for total assets, market value, and total debts of the borrowing 
firms. Data for daily market return is obtained from the DataStream Database and the 
proxy for the market from the DataStream value-weighted market portfolio.  
 
Standard market model of event study is employed in our study. Based on James5, 
Armitage15, and Boscaljon and Ho’s studies,1 our estimation period is 120 days 
starting from 130 days prior to the announcement date and ending at 10 days before 
the announcement date (as shown by period T0, T1 in Figure 1 below). The event 
period in this study is 21 days, which includes 10 trading days (-10) piror to the 
announcement date (t=0) to detect any information leakage and 10 trading days (+10) 
after the announcement to test the price adjustment. 
 
Most of the U.S. studies tested the period from -1 to 0, 0 or from 0 to +1 as the event 
window. Mikkelson and Partch17, James5, and Lummer and McConnell6 used the day 
the announcement appears in the Wall Street Journal as the event date. They assumed 
the announcements are made during trading hours of the previous day and reported 
with one-day lag. Based on this methodology, the event window they choose is days 
(-1,0). Following the previous studies, our event window is defined as (-1,0) to detect 
the market response to bank loan announcement. 
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If there is a favorable market response to loan announcement, a positive abnormal 
return is expected for the borrower’s stock. Abnormal return is defined as the 
difference between the actual return during the event window and the expected 
normal return (the return expected if the event did not take place) estimated over the 
estimation period. The expected normal return is generated by the market model of 
event study. 
 
On the other hand, there is a possibility of information leakage before the 
announcement is made. For example, James5 and Armitage15 both considered the 
information leakage problem in the process of market response to bank loan 
announcements in the U.S. market and use 41-trading-days event period in their 
research. Armitage tested this problem by calculating cumulative average 
standardized abnormal returns for the period of –11 to -2.15 However, their results are 
not significant, which indicate there is little or no leakage of loan information.  
 
Wong et al. 25 and Wong26 investigated the abnormal returns associated with insider 
trading in the Hong Kong stock market. By testing the abnormal returns during the 
pre-announcement period, this study reveals further evidence on the inside trading 
activities in the Hong Kong stock market. Following James5 and Armitage’s 
information leakage theory and methodology, 15 according to Research Question One, 
the cumulative standardized abnormal returns (CSARs) are calculated for days –10 to 
–2 to detect any information leakage. 
 
Market model is used in our research to test the abnormal returns from the bank loan 
announcements.  The model is given as follows: 
 
jt mtj jtjR Rβα ε= + +         (1) 
 
Where Rjt is the rate of return on security j on day t, αj and βj are market model 
parameters for firm j estimated by OLS regression, Rmt is the rate of return on the 
value-weighted market index on day t and εjt is the random error term for security j on 
day t. Based on Fama30, Beja31, and Fama,32 the estimation assumes the joint 
distribution of the returns is stationary throughout time.  
 
The abnormal return for firm j on day t is calculated as follows: 
 
)(jt jt mtjjAR R Rα β= − +        (2) 
Where ARjt is the abnormal return on security j on day t. The significance test of 
abnormal returns is based on standardized abnormal returns (SARjt). Standardized 
abnormal return is calculated as follows: 
 
Estimation 
Window 
Event 
Window 
Post-Event 
Window 
T0= -130 T1= -10 T2= +10 T3 T=0 
Figure 1.  Event Study Timeline for Loan Announcement 
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jt
jt
ARSAR S
=
        (3) 
 
Where Sjt is the standard error of the abnormal returns based on the prediction error 
adjustment. Sjt is calculated as follows: 
 
2
j jtjt V CS =          (4) 
 
Where 2jV  is residual variance of firm j’s market model regression, Cjt is the increase 
in variance due to prediction outside the estimation period.  Cjt is calculated as follows: 
 
2
2
1
( )11
( )
mt m
jt T
mi m
i
C
T
R R
R R
=
 
 −
 = + +
 − 
 
∑
       (5) 
 
Where Rm is the mean market return over the estimation period, Rmt is the market 
return during event period, Rmi is the market return during estimation period, and T is 
the number of days in the estimation period for firm j. T could be different among 
different firms. 
 
Abnormal returns are aggregated to obtain the general market response to bank loan 
announcements. Abnormal returns are summed (cumulative abnormal returns) for 
multiple event windows to test the market efficiency, and cross securities by different 
groups for day (-1,0) to test the factors that could influence the market response to 
loan announcement. During the aggregation process, it is assumed that there is no 
clustering or overlapping in the event windows of the included securities. The absence 
of clustering or overlapping shows that the abnormal returns or the cumulative 
abnormal returns will be independent across securities. 
 
The average standardized abnormal return for the portfolio is calculated as follows: 
 
1
1
1
jt
j
ASAR SAR
N =
= ∑         (6) 
 
Where N is the number of loan announcements. ASAR for firm j on t1=-1 and t2=0 are 
summed to generate the two-day cumulative average standardized abnormal returns 
(CASAR) and is defined as follows: 
 
2
1 2
1
( , )
t
t t t
t
CASAR ASAR=∑         (7) 
 
By assuming that individual abnormal returns are cross-sectionally independent and 
normally distributed, t-statistic could be tested as follows: 
 
tT NCASAR=          (8) 
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Under the null hypothesis of no announcement effect, the average standardized two-
day abnormal return (ASAR-1,0) of N loan announcements is distributed N (0,1/ N ) 
Ho: CASARt = 0 The sign of the CASARt will indicate whether the abnormal return is 
positive or negative. The full sample is classified into sub-groups by lender identity, 
syndication, loan purpose, borrower’s industry type, firm size, loan size, loan maturity, 
and debt ratio to further investigate the factors that could influence the market 
response to bank loan announcement.  
 
4. Empirical results  
4.1 Market response to loan announcements 
 
Two forms of method are available for testing the efficiency of the market, strong 
form and semi-strong form. The strong form efficiency tests whether insiders could 
earn abnormal profits by using non-public available information and the semi-strong 
form efficiency test whether non-insiders could earn abnormal profit from the 
information publicly available.26 Based on Wong26 and Wong et al. 25 studies and 
since the data for stock trade volume is not available in our study, we apply only the 
semi-strong efficiency test in our study. 
 
As shown in Table 1 Panel A, for the share price movement before the announcement 
date, the excess abnormal returns for the period (-10,-2) is significant for non-bank 
loan announcement. Armitage15 discussed the information leakage problem when 
testing the market response to bank loan announcements in the U.K. market. The 
author suggested if there is any information leakage, abnormal return should appear in 
the pre-announcement period. Non-bank loan announcement with a value of 2.51 is 
significant at the 0.05 level of significance in the pre-announcement period (-10,-2). 
This suggested a strong information leakage problem about the non-bank loan 
announcement. In terms of bank loan announcement, the CASAR is not statistically 
significant in the pre-announcement period, which does not indicate any information 
leakage problem.  
 
For the period -1 to 0, both full sample and bank loan announcement have significant 
CASARs. The result for non-bank loan announcement is not statistically significant as 
shown in Table 1 Panel B. 
 
 
Table 1. Cumulative Average Standardized Abnormal Return (CASAR) for for 
the following event period days: -10 to -2 and -1 to 0 for the full sample, 
bank loan announcements and non-bank loan announcements 
 
Panel A: CAARs, CASARs and the T-Stats for Event Days -10 to Day -2 
 CAAR (-10,-2) (%) CASAR(-10,-2) t Statistics 
Full Sample 0.36 0.0993 0.88 
Bank Loan -0.68 -0.0403 -0.31 
Non-Bank Loan 4.14 0.6084 2.51** 
    
Panel B: CAARs, CASARs and the T-Stats for Event Days -1 to Day 0   
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 CAAR (-1, 0) (%) CASAR(-1,0) t Statistics 
Full Sample 1.16 0.2399 2.13** 
Bank Loan 0.97 0.2595 2.04** 
Non-Bank Loan 0.18 0.1684 0.69 
CAAR: Cumulative Average Abnormal Return 
CASAR: Cumulative Average Standardized Abnormal Return 
* Significant at 10% level ** Significant at 5% level *** Significant at 1% level 
 
 
Wong et al.25 also reported a significant insider trading activities for the firms in Hong 
Kong stock market. The authors reported an average cumulative abnormal return of 
1.85% for the period –5 to –1. In addition, Wong26 examined the efficiency of the 
Hong Kong stock market and reported strong insider-trading activities among the 
listed firms. The author reported that the price increases significantly around day –10 
and reach almost 10% at the announcement date.  
 
Table 2 shows the results of the stock price response to loan announcements for the 
full sample. The average excess return for all bank loans is 0.9% and is statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level of significance. In addition, based on the 62 observations 
(one unfavourable bank loan announcements is excluded), 50% of the excess returns 
are positive. The average excess return for non-bank loan announcement is 1.86%, 
which is not statistically significant. The results suggest that bank has comparative 
advantage in gathering information and monitoring debt contract compare with other 
financial institutions. Thus bank loan announcements should convey valuable 
information to the market and the market should react favourable to bank loan 
announcements. This result is consistent with Fama’s inside debt argument.4 
 
Based on Fama’s insider debt argument, both bank loans and non-bank loans are 
inside debts, and the market react to both type of loans significantly positive. 
Inconsistent with Fama’s inside debt argument, Mikkelson and Partch17 and James5 
reported insignificant excess return to non-bank loan announcement. Consistent with 
Mikkelson and Partch17 and James, 5 average excess return for non-bank loan is found 
insignificant in our study. Our result further confirms the uniqueness role of bank in 
financial market. 
 
4.2 Results based on loan characteristics 
Panel B in Table 2 shows the results for two-day CASAR and AR for the sample 
divided by loan characteristics based on the sample of favourable bank loan 
announcement. 
 
Bank loan announcements are first categorized by loan syndication. Rajan33 and 
Houston and James34 reported a positive relationship between loan syndication and 
abnormal return. They both explained that single lender may cause information 
monopoly which may lead to hold-out problems. Multiple lenders could reduce hold-
out problems and enhance contractual flexibility. Recent research from Le35 examined 
the impact of syndicated loan announcements on the share price of the borrowing 
firms in the U.S. market, and reported that syndicated loans elicit positive market 
reaction. Our result is consistent with the finding from Rajan33, Houston and James34, 
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and Le.35 A significant positive abnormal return of 1.24% is found for syndicated loan 
with a t-value of 2.473 and statistically significant at the 0.01 level of significance. 
The abnormal return for non-syndicated bank loan is 0.37% and is not statistically 
significant. The results indicate that the Hong Kong stock market reacts positively to 
syndicated bank loans.  
 
In terms of loan size, Slovin et al. 14 examined the loan size effect to the market 
response to bank loan announcement, but their result is insignificant. Aintablian and 
Roberts9 also tested the loan size factor and found a negative relationship between the 
loan size and the abnormal returns. Our research result is consistent with Aintablian 
and Roberts’s findings.9 The two-day excess return for large size loan is 1.4% with a 
t-value of 0.699, but not statistically significant. For small size loan, the abnormal 
return is 0.7% with a t-value of 1.999, and is statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
of significance. It suggests that the bank has more information advantage for small 
size loan.  
 
In the third section of Panel B in Table 2, we classify the observations by loan 
purpose. Consistent with Boscaljon and Ho’s findings,1 the abnormal return for loans 
with general purpose is not statistically significant. The two-day excess return is 0.3% 
and t-value is 0.185. The abnormal returns for refinancing and capital expenditure 
group and no specific purpose are 1.55% and 0.7% with a t-value of 1.426 and 1.936, 
and statistically significant at the 0.1 level and the 0.05 level of significance 
respectively. Excess returns for other purpose category is not statistically significant. 
 
We further categorize bank loan announcements by loan maturity. According to 
James’ study,5 short-term debt is associated with less risk compared to longer term 
debt, and expect greater excess returns for shorter maturity loan. However, James’s 
result for loan maturity hypothesis is insignificant. James and Wier19 found a negative 
effect on the market reaction for loan maturity. Aintablian and Roberts9 also reported 
a positive effect of shorter maturity loan to the excess returns.   
 
Our results are consistent with James loan maturity argument.5 Bank loans with 
maturity of less than 3 years have a positive abnormal return of 2.47% with a t-value 
of 2.063 and statistically significant at the 0.1 level of significance. The abnormal 
returns of loans with maturity equal and longer than 3 years are not statistically 
significant, which failed to confirm the negative effect on market react to longer 
maturity loans.19,9 
 
4.3 Results based on Borrower Characteristics 
 
Panel C in Table 2 shows the CASAR and AR results for the period –1 to 0 with 
relevant t-values for the sample divided by borrower characteristics based on 
favourable bank loan announcement. 
 
Ongena, Smith and Michalsen36 suggested industry type could be a factor to influence 
market response to bank loan announcement. Boscaljon and Ho1 grouped industry 
types as computer, conglomerate, real estate, construction, and chemistry. The authors 
reported a significant positive abnormal return for computer industry and a significant 
negative abnormal return for construction industry. Consistent with Cheuk et al.27, 
following the classification of PACAP database, the types of industry in our study is 
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divided into property, consolidated enterprises, industrial, and others. Our result 
shows significant positive abnormal returns in property and industrial groups. The 
mean excess returns are 2.1% and 1.5% with t-value of 2.086 and 1.836 respectively 
and are statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance. The results for 
consolidated enterprises and others are not statistically significant. 
 
With regard to firm size, the two-day excess returns for small and large firms are 
3.4% and 0.4% with t-values of 2.009 and 1.291 respectively. The result for small 
firms is statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance and not statistically 
significant for large firms (see Table 2 Panel C). Our results are consistent with 
previous studies. For example, Slovin et al.14 concluded that monitoring services 
associate with private information structure of bank loans have a greater value for 
small firms than large firms. Wansley et al. 8 and Aintablian and Robert9 confirmed 
that small firms receive more benefit from bank monitoring services. Slovin et al.14 
explained that small firms have relatively more severe moral hazard and adverse 
selection problem. Moreover, compare to large firm, small firm has relatively shorter 
history, less information generated, and poor reputation. Therefore, the authors 
concluded the screening and monitoring services offered by bank is more valuable for 
small firms.  Recent research by Andre et al. 37 also found market response to loan 
announcements is more significant for small firms than large firms.  
 
Similar test is evaluated under the total asset classification for firm size. Our results 
are consistent with previous tests.14,8,9 The two-day excess returns for small firms are 
2.99% with a t-value of 1.681 and 0.39% with a t-value of 1.414 respectively, both 
statistically significant at 0.1 level of significants and confirm market response is 
more significant for small firms. 
 
Bank loan announcements are further classified based on the level of debt ratio. The 
two-day excess returns for high debt ratio are 2.22% with a t-value of 3.148 and 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level of significance. The abnormal return for low 
debt ratio is –0.05% with a t-value of –0.098 and not statistically significant. No 
previous study has examined the market response to bank loan announcement from 
the borrower’s debt ratio perspective. However, Bhandari38 tested the relationship 
between DE ratio and stock expected returns by combining DE ratio with the CAPM, 
and reported a coefficient of 0.13% for DE ratio and is significantly positive. 
Bhandari38 explained that as the DE ratio increase, the common equity of the firm also 
increase, including the risk involved, therefore, a positive relationship is expected 
between DE ratio and stock expected returns.  
 
Debt ratio measures the leverage of the firm, and the level of leverage is often a 
measurement for the risk level of the firm. Moreover, the high debt ratio indicates the 
total debt relative to firm’s assets is high, which means a bigger burden for the firm. 
In addition, interest payment for the debt would take a bigger amount in firm’s cash 
flows. Firm would also carry more risk for the increase of interest rate. The high debt 
ratio then could indicate that firm could take more advantages from the extra risk 
taken. On the other hand, low debt ratio indicates a low degree of leverage. Firm have 
relatively smaller burden for paying back the debt. However, low debt ratio also 
indicates that firm has an opportunity to use leverage as a means of responsibly 
growing the business that it is not taking advantage of. Therefore, low expected 
excess return is expected with low debt ratio. Consistent with the explanation from 
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Bhandari,38 the two-day excess returns for higher debt ratio borrower is significantly 
positive, but lower debt ratio borrower is statistically insignificant, which confirms 
the significant positive relationship between debt ratio and the excess returns to bank 
loan announcements. Based on the results, the Hong Kong stock market reacts 
positively to borrowers with higher debt ratio for the bank loan announcement.  
 
Table 2.  Cumulative Average Standardized Abnormal Return (CASAR) for 
Event Day -1 to 0 
Categories N CAAR (%)  CASAR T-Statistics 
Percent 
positive 
AR 
Percent 
positive 
SAR 
Panel A: Full Sample disaggregated by Lender Characteristics 
 Bank Loan 62 0.90 0.259 2.043** 50.00% 50.81% 
 Non-Bank Loan 17 1.86 0.168 0.694 64.17% 59.50% 
Panel B: Sample of Bank Loans disaggregated by loan Characteristics 
By Syndication       
 Syndicated 43 1.24 0.377 2.473*** 55.81% 51.10% 
 Non-Syndicated 19 0.37 -0.007 -0.029 36.84% 50.00% 
By Loan Size (Relative Loan Size)       
 Large 20 1.40 0.156 0.700 55.00% 55.00% 
 Small 42 0.70 0.309 1.999** 47.62% 47.62% 
By Loan Purpose       
 General 8 0.30 0.065 0.185 37.50% 50.00% 
 Refinancing and Capital Expenditure 24 1.55 0.291 1.426* 50.00% 50.00% 
 No Specific Purpose 20 0.70 0.433 1.936** 55.00% 55.00% 
 Others 10 -1.00 -0.008 -0.026 40.00% 50.00% 
By Loan Maturity       
 < 3 year 4 2.47 1.032 2.063* 75.00% 62.50% 
 3 year 18 -0.10 0.063 0.268 50.00% 47.22% 
 > 3 year 32 1.30 0.198 1.122 43.75% 47.54% 
Panel C: Sample of Bank Loans disaggregated by Borrower Characteristics 
By Industry       
 Property 7 2.10 0.789 2.086** 42.85% 57.14% 
 Consolidated Enterprises 14 -0.90 -0.133 -0.497 50.00% 46.43% 
 Industrial 33 1.50 0.320 1.836** 48.49% 51.52% 
 Others 8 1.20 0.235 0.665 62.50% 50.00% 
By Firm Size (Total Asset)       
 Large 50 0.40 0.183 1.291 46.00% 50.00% 
 Small 12 3.40 0.580 2.009** 66.67% 54.20% 
By Firm Size (MV)       
 Large 48 0.39 0.204 1.414* 45.83% 48.96% 
 Small 14 2.99 0.449 1.681* 64.29% 57.14% 
By Debt Ratio       
 High 28 2.22 0.595 3.148*** 60.71% 57.14% 
  Low 34 -0.05 -0.017 -0.098 41.18% 45.59% 
 
CAAR: Cumulative Average Abnormal Return   
CASAR: Cumulative Average Standardized Abnormal Return 
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* Significant at 10% level   
** Significant at 5% level   
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
4.4 Insider Trading 
There is a significant information leakage and inside trading activity before the 
announcement date for non-bank loan announcement. The excess return for the pre-
announcement period (-10,-2) is 4.14% with a t-value of 2.51, and statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level of significance (see Table 1 Panel A). The excess return 
from day -10 to day -2 is not statistically significant for bank loan announcement. 
Therefore, there is no evidence of information leakage problem for bank loan 
announcement, but a strong information leakage and inside trading activity for non-
bank loan announcement during the pre-announcement period (see Table 1 Panel A). 
 
Wong et al. 25 and Cheuk et al. 27 tested the insider trading in the Hong Kong stock 
market and reported that abnormal price performance associated with insider trading 
are concentrated on smaller firms. Our result is consistent with Wong et al. and Cheuk 
et al.’s findings.25,27 Following Wong et al.25 and Cheuk et al.’s study,27 our research 
sample is divided into two equal parts according to firm size, which is measured by 
market capitalization and the insider trading period is defined from days -10 to -2. 
Our result showed the average excess return in period -10 to -2 for small firms is 
7.1% with a t-value of 2.66, and statistically significant at the 0.05 level of 
significance. For large firms, the abnormal return is 0.8% with a t-value of 0.83, and 
is not statistically significant (see Table 3 Panel A).  
 
Since the separation of management and ownership is rare for small firms, managers 
or owners are more informed about the business situation of their own firms, insider 
trading which involves the director of small firms are most likely to be profitable.27 
 
Wong26 investigated the insider trading problem in the Hong Kong stock market and 
concluded very little unusual price and volume behaviour for both Hong Kong and the 
U.S. stocks. However, Wong’s result showed a strong evidence of insider-trading 
activities among the Red-Chips and H-Share stocks of the China-affiliated firms listed 
in the Hong Kong stock market. Our result also confirms the finding from Wong.26  
 
The average excess return from day -10 to -2 is 0.3% for China-affiliated firms with a 
t-value of 2.80, and is statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance. For 
non-China-affiliated firms, the average excess return is 2.3% with a t-value of 1.31 
and is not statistically significant (see Table 3 Panel B).  
 
Table 3. CAARs, CASARs, and the T-Stats for Event Days -10 to Day -2 
(For Non-Bank Loan Announcement disaggregated by Firm Size and 
Firm’s Location) 
 
Categories 
  
Number of 
Observation 
CAAR     
(%) CASAR T-Statistics 
Percent 
positive 
Abnormal 
Returns 
Panel A: Sample disaggregated by firm size    
 small firm 9 7.1 0.88 2.66** 77.78% 
 large firm 8 0.8 0.29 0.83 50.00% 
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Panel B: Sample disaggregated by firm's location    
 non-China-affiliated 13 2.3 0.36 1.31 61.54% 
  China-affiliated 4 0.3 1.40 2.80** 75.00% 
 
CAAR: Cumulative Average Abnormal Return 
CASAR: Cumulative Average Standardized Abnormal Return 
** Significant at 5% level   
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
Based on Wong26, severe poor disclosure, low transparency, and relation-based 
system problem existed for Chinese firms’ entities. Therefore, although these firms 
are listed in the Hong Kong stock market, since the parents of both Red-Chips and H-
shares are regulated from Beijing, the Hong Kong Securities, and Futures 
Commission could not sufficient regulate these firms, and the insider trading problem 
is more severe for China-affiliated firms listed in Hong Kong stock market. 
 
 
5. Regression Analysis 
We estimate a multivariate regression for the 62 bank loan announcements with a 
two-day announcement period (-1, 0), and using standardized excess return as the 
dependent variable. The regression analysis could validate the results from the earlier 
tests (see Table 2) in two ways. First, the problem of small sample sizes in the earlier 
tests could be avoided by employing dummy variables. Second, the joint test on all 
major variables studied addresses the problem of potential interdependencies between 
the loan characteristic variables. 
 
The independent variables, D1, D2, D3, and D4, are dummy variables representing (1) if 
the loan is a syndicated loan (2) the if loan is for refinancing purpose loan, (3) if the 
loan has no specific purpose, and (4) if the loan is for other purposes, or zero 
otherwise.  
 
D5, D6, D7, and D8 are dummy variables presenting (1) if the borrower is property 
industry type, (2) if the borrower is industrial industry type, (3) if the borrower is 
other industry type, and (4) if the borrower is large sized firm, or zero otherwise.  X1, 
X2, and X3 are continuous variables. X1 indicates the relative loan size defined as loan 
size divided by the market value of the firm, X2 is loan maturity, and X3 is the debt 
ratio defined as total debt divided by total asset of the firm.  
 
The regression results are presented in Table 4. The first four dummy variables (D1, 
D2, D3, and D4) test whether the loan syndication and loan purpose could affect excess 
returns. The coefficient for loans with refinancing purpose and no specific purpose is 
1.1967 and 1.2784, with t-values of 1.933 and 2.061, respectively and both are 
statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance. Our result shows that excess 
returns are significantly higher when the loans are for refinancing purpose and no 
specific purpose. This support the finding of Boscaljon and Ho1 and the results tested 
in the earlier tests. 
 
D5, D6, and D7 show test how the borrower’s industry type could influence the market 
response to bank loan announcement. According to Table 4, the coefficients for 
property industry and industrial industry are 1.609 and 0.931, with t-values of 2.84 
and 2.32 respectively, and both are statistically significant at the 0.05 level of 
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significance. The results indicate that the excess returns are significantly positive and 
higher for borrowers with “property” and “industrial” industries. After eliminating the 
problem of small sample size by using dummy variables, the regression results further 
support the finding in the previous tests, where only property industry and industrial 
industry have statistically significant abnormal returns (see Table 2).   
 
Moreover, the significance of D8 suggests that small firm size is associated with more 
excess returns. The coefficient for D8 is -0.7322 with a t-value of -1.37, and 
statistically significant at the 0.1 level of significance. The significant negative 
coefficient further confirms the negative relationship between the borrower’s firm size 
and excess returns. This enhances the argument by Slovin et al., Wansley et al., and 
Aintablian and Robert.14,8,9 The authors suggested that small firms have relatively 
higher moral hazard and adverse selection problem, lower reputation and less 
information produced, therefore, small firms receive more benefit from bank 
screening and monitoring services than large firms.  
 
The variable X1 tests the relationship between loan size and the market response to 
bank loan announcement. The coefficient of X1 is -0.0006, with a t-value of -1.364, 
and statistically significant at the 0.1 level of significance. The significant negative 
coefficient of loan size suggests that smaller size loan is associated with larger excess 
returns and can be explained by the risk consideration.  Risk increases as the size of 
loan increases, and market response to larger size loan negatively.39 Our regression 
result is consistent with the results in earlier tests, where small size loan has a 
significant positive abnormal returns. In addition, our regression result further 
confirms the finding of Aintablian and Roberts that larger loans are associated with 
smaller excess returns.9  
 
The variable X3 is debt ratio calculated using total debt divided by total asset. The 
coefficient is 3.366 with a t-value of 2.568, statistically significant at the 0.05 level of 
significance. The significant positive coefficient indicates that higher debt ratio is 
associated with a higher excess returns. The abnormal return for borrowers with high 
debt ratio is statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance and not 
statistically significant for borrowers with low debt ratio. The coefficient further 
confirms the positive relationship between debt ratio and excess returns. It also 
confirms the finding of Bhandari that DE ratio is significant and positively related to 
stock expected returns.28 
 
 
Table 4. Results of Regression of Standardized Abnormal Returns on various 
Standardized Dummy Variables for a Sample of 63 Bank Loans 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
       
Intercept -1.9762 0.9371 -2.1089 0.041 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1311     
D1 0.1211 0.4257 0.285 0.7774 
(1 if syndicated loan,0 otherwise)     
D2 1.1967 0.6191 1.933** 0.06 
(1 if refinancing purpose, 0 otherwise)    
D3 1.2784 0.6202 2.06** 0.0455 
(1 if no specific purpose, 0 otherwise)    
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D4 1.0092 1.3546 0.75 0.4604 
(1 if other purpose, 0 otherwise)     
D5 1.6090 0.5676 2.84** 0.007 
(1 if property industry type, 0 otherwise)    
D6 0.9310 0.4009 2.32** 0.0251 
(1 if industrial industry type, 0 otherwise)    
D7 0.3497 0.5650 0.62 0.5393 
(1 if other industry type, 0 otherwise)    
D8 -0.7322 0.5348 -1.37* 0.1782 
(Yearly market capitalization)     
X1 -0.0006 0.0004 -1.364* 0.1799 
(loan size divided by market capitalization)    
X2 0.0349 0.1336 0.2616 0.7949 
Loan Maturity      
X3 3.3660 1.310686 2.568** 0.0139 
(total debt divided by total asset) 
 
R2: 0.093 
F-statistic: 4.54               
Durbin-Watson statistics: 1.46       
* Significant at 10% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 1% level 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
Our results show that the Hong Kong market response to bank loan announcement is 
positively significant, but insignificant for non-bank loan announcement. Furthermore, 
our results show no evidence of information leakage problem for bank loan 
announcement, and no continuous abnormal return during the post-event period. In 
addition, the abnormal return only occurred during the two-day event window. Our 
results confirm the findings from previous studies, 5,17,9 which suggested banks are 
“special” in financial market based on the comparative advantages in screening and 
monitoring borrowers by accessing borrowers’ private information not available to 
other market participants. Our results also indicate that the Hong Kong stock market 
is efficient in both strong form and semi-strong form for bank loan announcement. 
For non-bank loan announcement, there is a strong evidence of information leakage 
problem.  
 
We test the special role of bank in Hong Kong financial market by comparing the 
difference between the market response to bank loan announcements and non-bank 
loan announcements. Our results suggest that the Hong Kong market response to bank 
loan announcements is statistically positively significant at the 0.05 level of 
significance, whereas, the abnormal return for non-bank loan announcements is not 
statistically significant. The result further confirms the uniqueness role of bank in 
Hong Kong financial market. 
 
In addition, market response to bank loan announcements could be partially explained 
by loan maturity, loan purpose, loan size, borrower’s firm size, borrower’s debt ratio, 
and borrower’s industry type. Our results demonstrate that Hong Kong market 
response to bank loan announcement is positively related to loan syndication, shorter 
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maturity loan, refinancing and capital expenditure purpose bank loan, no specific 
purpose bank loan, borrower’s debt ratio, borrowers with property industrial type and 
borrowers with property industry type. The market on bank loan announcement reacts 
negatively to borrowers’ firm size and loan size. These results are generally consistent 
with existing literatures.5,17,33,14,9,1 Our results show consistent findings under a 
different banking system and environment are robust for the Hong Kong market 
compared to previous studies conducted in the US, Canadian, and the U.K. market.  
 
However, the low R2 value in regression model reveals that there are other variables 
which could also influence market response to bank loan announcement. For example, 
loan type (new loan or renewal loan), lender reputation, and borrower reputation are 
not included in our study which could potentially influence the market response to 
bank loan announcement. 
 
There are certain limitations in our study. First, the only data source used in our 
research is the Hong Kong Exchange database (HKEX). This limits the number of 
loan announcements obtained for our study. In addition, the requirement for 
announcement submission of soft copy is only mandatory for all listed companies 
after February 15, 2002 for HKEX database, and this limits our research period from 
May 1st, 2002 to December 31st, 2007. Based on the relatively short testing period, the 
number of renewal loan announcements obtained is quite small. This limits the test of 
Fama’s renewal hypothesis, 4 which compared the market response between new bank 
loan announcement and renewal bank loan announcements. 
 
Small sample size is another limitation in our study. The initial number of loan 
announcements obtained is 606. However, further deletion is proceeded to select 
“clean” loan announcements, which results in 63 bank loan announcements and 17 
non-bank loan announcements as our final research sample. The small sample size is 
consistent with the relatively smaller market capitalisation in Hong Kong stock 
market compared to the U.S. market. The sample size could be increased by 
expanding research period and using multiple data source, however, both of these two 
solutions are limited in the HKEX database. 
 
The lack of data for pre-announcement period is another limitation. Our results 
indicate there is a strong information leakage problem for non-bank loan 
announcement. Based on the studies from Wong et al. 25 and Wong, 26 in order to test 
whether insiders could earn profits based on the information not publicly available 
during the pre-announcement period, data of stock trade price and stock trade volume 
are needed. Since the data for stock trade price and volume are not available, we 
could not test the strong-form of market efficiency for non-bank loan announcement.  
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